SAA29LA01-003

REV. A

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SYS: BALL/BAR LIGHTS (PORTABLE SYSTEM)

Critical Item:

Variable Transformer (3 Items Total)

Find Number:

AT1

Criticality Category:

1 (Night Landing Only)

SAA No:

29LA01-003

System/Area:

Visual Landing Aids at SLS #1

NASA

PMN/ Name: U72-1336-02 Ball/Bar Lights

Part No:

Technipower

Drawing/

B0K51889

Mfa/

Part No: W30 Sheet Na:

Function: Provide controlled voltage to Bar Light Assemblies 2, 4 and 6.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No: Fails short to ground/29LA01-003.021 29LA01-003.022, 29LA01-003.023.

Failure Cause: Structural Fallure/Contamination/Corresion

Failure Effect: Disconnect switch fuse S1B will open resulting in loss of power to Bar Light Assemblies 2, 4 and 5, and Satt Lights 1 and 2. Loss of ability to acquire and maintain the proper inner glidestope during landing operations. Possible loss of life/vehicle.

Time to Effect: Immediate, during inner glideslope use.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:	Rated	Estimated Operating
	Voltage = 120/240 max.	60.0 valts autput
	Current = 25 amps	19.8 amps output

o Transformer is mounted in a NEMA 4 Hoffman enclosure. . . .

Text: Meets requirements of MiL-9TD-202, "Test Methods for Electronic and Electrical Components." Tested for vibration, shock, dielectric withstand voltage and rotational life in accordance with MIL-STD-202.

 The OMRSD, File VI will require vertication of proper operation prior to each operational use.

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 GEGS Technical Directives TD 1-4 and 1-5 require verification of proper operation the day before, and again the day of Shuttle training aircraft and Orbiter landing operations.

Inspection: GEGS Technical Directives will require that equipment is physically inspected for corrosion, contamination and/or physical damage annually.

Fallure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

Correcting Action:

There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.

Timeframe:

Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.